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Abstract:	 The	 proliferation	 of	 smart	
spaces,	 such	 as	 smart	 	 buildings,	 is	
increasing	 security	 vulnerabilities	
arising	 from	 the	 interplay	 between	
cyber	 and	 physical	 entities.	 We	
proposed	 that	 a	 representation	 of	 the	
topology	 of	 cyber	 and	 physical	 spaces	
may	 provide	 security-relevant	
contextual	 characteristics	 and	 support	
the	 verification	 of	 security	
requirements.	We	also	developed	a	tool	
that	 enables	 editing	 and	 visualising	 of	
security-relevant	 topological	
characteristics	 of	 a	 building,	 and	
verifying	 that	 access	 control	 policies	
satisfy	 security	 requirements.	 In	 this	
article	 we	 report	 on	 our	 experience	 of	
applying	 our	 approach	 and	 the	 tool	 to	
solve	 practical	 physical	 access	 control	
problems,	 and	 provide	 some	 lessons	
learned	 for	 researchers	 and	
practitioners.	
	




Access	 control	 provides	 the	 capability	
to	manage	the	access	of	groups	of	users	
to	 particular	 assets.	 In	 practice,	 access	
control	 is	 difficult	 to	 manage	 within	
large	 organisations1,	 as	 each	 employee	
must	be	granted	the	exact	level	of	access	
she	 needs	 depending	 on	 her	 role.	 This	
difficulty	may	be	exacerbated	when	 the	
roles	 covered	 by	 an	 employee	 vary	
frequently;	 within	 large	 organisations	
this	 can	 happen	 every	 three	 months2.	
Despite	 the	 substantial	 research	
literature	 and	 high-profile	 security	
products,	security	analysts	still	have	no	
means	to	verify	whether	existing	access	
control	 policies	 grant	 the	 exact	 access	
level	 that	 employees	 need.	 Moreover,	
many	 organisations	 fall	 short	 of	
implementing	the	correct	access	control	
policies.	 For	 example,	 50	 to	 90	 percent	
of	 employees	 are	 over-entitled	 in	 large	
organisations2,	 increasing	opportunities	
for	insiders	to	cause	harm.	
In	 previous	 work3	 we	 argued	 that	 a	
representation	 of	 the	 topology	 of	 cyber	
and	 physical	 spaces,	 representing	 their	





a	physical	 space	 can	 capture	 the	 layout	
of	 a	 building	 including	 its	 structural	
relationships,	such	as	containment	(e.g.,	
a	 building	 contains	 rooms),	 and	
connectivity	 (e.g.,	 two	 rooms	 are	
connected	 through	 a	 door).	 Similarly,	
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the	 topology	 of	 a	 cyber	 space	 can	
capture	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	
network	 and	 the	 digital	 devices	 within	
the	 building,	 also	 including	
relationships	 such	 as	 containment	 (e.g.,	
a	 file	 is	 stored	 in	 a	 device)	 and	
connectivity	(e.g.,	two	digital	devices	are	
connected	 through	 the	 network).	 We	
also	 proposed	 the	 use	 of	 a	 meta-
calculus4	 to	 represent	 the	 topology	 of	
both	 cyber	 and	 physical	 spaces	 and	 its	
dynamics,	and	utilised	such	a	composite	
model	 to	 reason	 about	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	
topological	 configurations	 on	 the	
satisfaction	 of	 security	 requirements	
through	model	checking.	
To	 support	 access	 control	 of	 smart	
spaces	 we	 apply	 and	 extend	 our	 work,	
focusing	 on	 the	 representation	 of	 the	
topology	of	a	smart	building	and	on	the	
verification	 of	 access	 control	 policies.	
We	developed	 a	 tool	 to	 enable	 security	
analysts	to	visualise	and	edit	topological	
characteristics	 of	 a	 building	 and	 verify	
whether	 access	 control	 policies	 satisfy	
security	 requirements	 expressed	 on	
reachability	 relationships	 (e.g.,	whether	
an	 agent	 can	 reach	 specific	 assets	 or	
building	 areas).	 If	 the	 verification	 fails,	
the	 tool	 provides	 explanations	 on	 how	
existing	credentials	should	be	revised	in	
terms	 of	 the	 current	 topological	
configuration	 of	 the	 space.	 To	 ensure	
wider	applicability	of	our	approach,	our	
representation	 of	 a	 building	 topology	 -	
hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 BIM-Sec	 -	
complies	 with	 an	 existing	 industry	
standard,	 the	 Building	 Information	
Model	(BIM)5.	
In	 this	 article	 we	 focus	 on	 physical	
access	 control.	 We	 describe	 our	
experience	of	applying	our	 tool	 to	a	set	
of	 practical	 physical	 access	 control	
scenarios	provided	by	security	analysts.	
Our	 contribution	 shows	 how	 a	 system	
founded	 on	 software	 engineering	
principles,	 such	 as	 interactive	
development,	 visual	 abstraction,	 formal	
modelling,	 and	 requirements	
specification,	 can	be	applied	 to	 support	





software	 for	 architects	 enables	
representing	 structural	 and	 functional	
characteristics	 of	 buildings.	 Industry	
Foundation	 Classes	 (IFC)6	 has	 become	
the	 de-facto	 standard	 format	 for	
exchanging	 BIM	 models	 in	 the	
construction	 industry.	 Despite	 its	
widespread	 adoption,	 BIM	 is	 not	
expressive	 enough	 to	 represent	
security-relevant	 characteristics	 of	 a	
building.	 For	 example,	 BIM	 models	 do	
not	 include	 a representation	 of	 cyber	
and	 physical	 assets	 and	 access	 control	
policies.	 Moreover,	 the	 graphical	 tools	
adopted	 to	 create	 and	 modify	 BIM	
models,	 such	 as	 Revit7,	 do	 not	 support	
security	 analysis.	 BIM	 is	 also	 perceived	
as	 overly	 expressive	 and	 heavyweight	
for	security	analysts:	detailed	structural	
properties	 that	 might	 be	 relevant	 for	
architects	 are	 often	 irrelevant	 for	 the	
definition	of	access	control	policies.	
So,	 we	 defined	 BIM-Sec	 (Figure	 1),	 a	
lightweight	 version	 of	 the	 IFC	 meta-
model	 that	 also	 includes	 entities	 that	
were	 identified	 as	 security-relevant	 by	
access	 control	 practitioners.	 Entities	
supported	 in	 IFC	 are	 represented	 in	
grey.	 Some	 intermediate	 relationships	
between	 IFC	 entities	 are	 omitted	 to	
simplify	the	figure.		
A	building	is	represented	as	a	collection	
of	 rooms,	 with	 each	 room	 represented	
as	an	IfcProduct	element	labelled	with	a	
name	 and	 an	 identifier	 inherited	 from	
IfcSpace.	A	room	can	also	contain	other	
building	structural	elements	(e.g.,	walls,	
furniture)	 as	 described	 by	 the	
relationship	 ContainsElement	 brought	
by	 IfcSpace.	Each	room	can	be	bounded	
by	 walls	 (IfcWall),	 which	 in	 turn	 can	
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have	 opening	 points,	 each	 of	 which	
indicates	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 door	
(IfcDoor)	 or	 a	 window	 (IfcWindow).	 A	
door	 or	 a	 window	 may	 enable	
connectivity	of	a	room	to	another	room,	
as	 indicated	 by	 the	 RelatingSpace	
relationship.	 A	 building	 structural	
element	 (IfcProduct)	 is	 also	
characterised	 by	 its	 location	
(ObjectPlacement	 relationship).	 In	
particular,	IfcLocalPlacement	defines	the	
relative	 placement	 of	 an	 element	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 placement	 of	 other	
spaces	 that	 may	 contain	 it	
(PlacementRelTo	 relationship).	 Each	
building	 structural	 element	 can	 also	 be	




BIM-Sec	 includes	 additional	 physical	
and	 cyber	 entities	 that	 are	 not	 fully	
supported	 in	 IFC.	 In	 particular,	 we	
extend	 IfcProduct	 to	 also	 represent	 a	








building.	 Access	 control	 policies	 are	
expressed	 according	 to	 the	 Role-Based	
Access	 Control8	 (RBAC)	 model	 by	
associating	 each	 agent	 with	 a	 set	 of	
Roles.	A	role	is	in	turn	associated	with	a	
set	 of	 credentials,	 i.e.	 a	 list	 of	 physical	
areas	and	assets	 that	role	grants	access	
to.	 An	 alternative	 model	 is	 Attribute-
Based	 Access	 Control	 (ABAC)9	 model,	
according	 to	 which	 authorisation	 to	
perform	 a	 set	 of	 operations	 is	
determined	 by	 evaluating	 attributes	
associated	with	 the	 subject,	 object,	 and	
requested	 operations.	 Although	 ABAC	
would	 allow	 defining	 more	 dynamic	
access	 control	 policies	 (e.g.,	 blocking	
access	 temporarily),	 we	 used	 RBAC	
since	 it	 is	 the	most	widely	 used	 access	
control	model	in	practice.	
Both	 agents	 and	 physical	 assets	 can	 be	
contained	 in	 a	 physical	 space;	 this	 can	
be	 indicated	 by	 the	 containedIn	
relationship,	which	 is	 explicitly	 defined	
for	 the	 physical	 assets	 that	 were	 not	


























































































A	 physical	 asset	 can	 also	 represent	 a	
Device,	 such	 as	 a	 Light	 or	 an	 HVAC	 (a	
Heating,	 Ventilation,	 Air	 Conditioning	
unit).	Devices	can	connect	to	other	ones	
and	 are	 characterised	 by	 a	 status	 (on,	
off,	broken).		Lights	are	security-relevant	
because,	 for	 example,	 their	
malfunctioning	 may	 allow	 an	 offender	
to	 access	 a	 valuable	 asset	 unnoticed.	
HVACs	 are	 security-relevant	 because	
their	 malfunctioning	 may	 compromise	
the	 integrity	 of	 data	 centres	 and	 other	
critical	 equipment	 co-located	 in	 the	
same	 area	 and	 requiring	 a	 specific	
target	temperature	to	function	properly.	
Note	 that	 although	 the	 IFC	 standard	
supports	the	representation	of	an	HVAC	
(IfcHvacDomain	 element),	 it	 does	 not	
allow	 the	 representation	 of	 its	 current	
status	and	network	connectivity.	
We	 also	 specify	 ComputingDevices	 that	
can	contain	CyberAssets,	such	as	Files	or	
Applications.	 A	 computing	 device	 is	
security-relevant	since	confidential	files	
or	critical	applications	 they	contain	can	
be	 accessed	 directly	 or	 from	 other	
devices	 connected	 to	 it.	 Moreover,	
representing	the	status	of	files	(open	or	
not)	 allows	 the	 detection	 of	 whether	
agents	 -	 who	 are	 co-located	 in	 the	
physical	space	with	the	device	in	which	
the	 file	 is	 stored	 -	 can	 see	 it	 breaching	
its	confidentiality.	
Gateways	 and	 Ethernet	 Cables	 enable	
network	 connectivity	 and	 allow	
accessibility	 to	 the	 devices	 connected.	
Representing	 network	 connectivity	 is	
particularly	 relevant	 in	 building	
Figure	2.	Graphical	interface	of	our	tool;	extended	functionalities	are	indicated	in	red.	

















security	 features.	 For	 example,	
passwords	 employed	 to	 authenticate	
valid	 commands	 may	 be	 sent	 in	 clear	
text	 on	 the	 network,	 thus	 allowing	 key	
sniffing.	 For	 the	 gateway,	 we	 also	
represent	the	network	cables	connected	
to	 its	 ports	 and	 the	 rooms	 covered	 by	
the	WiFi	signal.	For	each	network	cable	











to	 import,	 modify	 and	 analyse	 smart	
buildings.	 It	 extends	 SweetHome3D	
(http://www.sweethome3d.com),	 an	
open	 source	 software	 application	 for	




















A	 screenshot	 of	 the	 graphical	 interface	
of	 our	 tool	 is	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2.	 From	
the	first	area	of	the	GUI	it	 is	possible	to	
import	 3D	 representations	 of	 entities	
and	edit	their	attributes	as	shown	in	the	
second	 area.	 In	 the	 third	 area	 it	 is	




analysts	can	 import	an	 IFC	 file	and	edit	
its	 corresponding	 BIM-Sec	
representation,	which	is	maintained	and	
modified	 locally.	 In	 particular,	 our	 tool	
extracts	 only	 those	 entities	 and	
properties	 that	 are	 security-relevant	
and	 ignores	 objects	 characterising	
complex	 architectural	 properties	 or	
other	 furniture	 elements.	 Security	
analysts	can	enrich	a	BIM-Sec	model	by	
updating	 assets’	 status	 and	 contained	
cyber	 assets,	 identifying	 network	
connectivity	 between	 two	 devices,	 and	
specifying	 	 	 access	 control	 policies.	
Security	 analysts	 can	 also	 export	 the	
modified	 BIM-Sec	 model	 into	 a	 textual	
format	(e.g.,	XML)	to	support	portability	
to	 existing	 access	 control	 systems,	 as	
well	 as	 external	 applications	 which	
might	 leverage	 the	 building	 model	 to	
verify	other	non-security	 requirements,	
such	as	energy	efficiency,	and	safety.	
To	 support	 security	 analysis	 our	 tool	
generates	 a	 graph	 representing	 the	
topology	of	the	cyber	and	physical	space	
from	a	BIM-sec	model.	Each	node	of	the	
graph	 can	 represent	 a	 room	 (i.e.	
instance	 of	 the	 IfcProduct	 class	
representing	 a	 building	 area),	 or	 an	
asset.	 The	 links	 of	 the	 graph	 are	
annotated	 with	 their	 type	 expressing	
the	nature	of	the	relation.	A	connectivity	
link	 between	 two	 rooms	 indicates	
physical	connectivity;	it	is	created	if	the	
rooms	are	connected	through	a	door	or	
a	 window.	 A	 connectivity	 link	 between	
two	 devices	 indicates	 network	
connectivity.	 A	 containment	 link	
indicates	 a	 containment	 relationship;	 it	
is	 created	 between	 a	 room	 and	 the	
physical	assets	it	contains	or	between	a	
digital	 device	 and	 the	 cyber	 assets	 it	
contains.	 We	 assume	 the	 graph	
generated	is	always	connected.	





the	 graph.	 We	 apply	 the	 breadth-first	
search	 algorithm,	 whose	 complexity	 is	
linear;	 this	 ensures	 scalability	 in	
practical	settings.	
	Note	 that	 our	 tool	 presents	 some	
limitations	related	to	the	parsing	of	 IFC	
files.	We	only	support	rooms	defined	as	
rectangular	 shapes	 in	 the	 IFC	 standard.	
Finally,	 our	 IFC	 parser	 was	 tested	 for	
simple	 building	 plans	 having	 just	 one	




In	 this	 section	 we	 demonstrate	 the	
broader	applicability	of	our	approach	by	


















scenarios,	 as	 indicated	 by	 practical	
needs	 of	 access	 control	 practitioners.	
Although	 scenarios	 presented	 here	 are	
rather	 simple,	 the	 sheer	 size	 of	 the	




from	 an	 existing	 IFC	 file	 and	 further	
edited	 for	 our	 scenarios	 is	 shown	 in	
Figure	 3.	 The	 building	 includes	 five	
rooms:	 Office1,	 Office2,	 MainRoom,	
SafeRoom,	 and	PrinterRoom.	 Each	 room	
can	 contain	 security	 relevant	 entities;	
for	example	the	PrinterRoom	contains	a	
Printer,	while	the	MainRoom	contains	an	
HVAC	 and	 a	 Gateway,	 whose	 wireless	
signal	 covers	 all	 rooms	 in	 the	 building.	
Office1	and	Office2	contain	Desktop1	and	
Desktop2,	respectively.	Agents	Alice	and	
Eve	 are	 in	 Office1.	 Existing	 network	
connections	 are	 also	 shown	 as	
continuous	 lines	 connecting	 different	
devices	 in	 Figure	 3.	 The	 graph	
representing	 the	 building	 topology	 is	
shown	in	Figure	4.	
We	created	RBAC	policies	by	associating	
Alice	 and	 Eve	with	 roles	Employee	 and	
Visitor,	respectively,	and	by	assigning	to	
each	 role	 the	 following	 credentials	 (i.e.	
list	of	rooms	and	assets	each	role	grants	
access	to).		
• Employee:	 PrinterRoom,	 Office1,	
Office2,	SafeRoom,	Desktop2;	
• Visitor:	 PrinterRoom,	 Office1,	
Office2,	MainRoom,	Desktop1.	
The	 usage	 scenarios	 are	 described	 as	
follows.		
For	 the	 first	 scenario	 we	 verify	
requirement	R1:	 “Every	Employee	in	the	
building	 should	 reach	 the	 SafeRoom”.	
This	 requirement	 is	 not	 satisfied	 since	
the	 credentials	 associated	 with	 the	
Employee	 role	 only	 take	 into	 account	
accessibility	 to	 the	 SafeRoom	 without	
considering	 other	 rooms	 that	 might	
need	 to	 be	 traversed	 to	 access	 the	
SafeRoom.	 When	 a	 security	 analysis	
provides	 a	 negative	 outcome	 our	 tool	
presents	 a	 counterexample	 graph	
showing	 containment	 and	 connectivity	
relationships	between	assets	and	rooms	
in	 the	 cyber	 and/or	 physical	 space	
determining	the	violation	of	the	security	
requirement.	 We	 use	 a	 dashed	 line	 to	
indicate	 those	 relationships	 that	 made	
the	 security	analysis	 fail	 either	because	
they	are	missing	(e.g.,	two	rooms	are	not	
connected	 through	 a	 door/window)	 or	




shown	 in	 Figure	 5;	 the	 line	 connecting	
Office1	 and	 the	 MainRoom	 is	 dashed	
because	 Alice	 does	 not	 have	 access	
rights	 to	enter	 the	MainRoom,	although	
Office1	 and	 the	 MainRoom	 are	
connected.	
For	 the	 second	 scenario	 we	 verify	
requirement	 R2:	 “Every	 Visitor	 should	
not	 reach	 CCTV2”.	 This	 requirement	 is	
also	 violated	 because	 --	 although	 Eve	
does	not	have	access	to	the	SafeRoom	--	
she	can	connect	to	CCTV2,	which	shares	
the	 same	 network	 connection	 as	
Desktop1.	 The	 graph	 associated	 with	
the	outcome	of	this	analysis	is	shown	in	
Figure	 6.	 Eve	 is	 co-located	 with	
Desktop1	and	has	the	right	to	access	 it;	
the	 links	 between	 Desktop1,	 the	
Gateway	 and	 CCTV2	 identify	 existing	
network	 connectivity	 that	 can	 be	


















and	 its	 status	 is	 open),	 and	 all	
Employees	 now	 are	 also	 entitled	 to	
access	 the	 MainRoom.	 We	 verify	
requirement	 R3:	 “No	 Employee	 should	
reach	Doc.pdf”.	 This	 requirement	 is	 not	
satisfied,	 because	 although	 Alice	 does	
not	have	direct	access	to	the	Printer,	she	
might	 traverse	 the	 PrinterRoom	 while	
the	 document	 is	 being	 printed	 (status	
open).	This	is	equivalent	to	having	Alice	
co-located	 with	 the	 document	 and	
violating	the	required	security	property.		
Lessons	Learned	
The	 experience	 of	 applying	 our	
approach	 to	 the	physical	 access	 control	
problem	domain	provided	us	with	some	
key	 insights	 and	 lessons	 learned	
summarised	below.	
Topology	 is	 worth	 it.	 Explicitly	
modelling	 topology	 ensures	 a	 focus	 on	
what	 needs	 protection,	 rather	 than	 on	
other	 secondary	 concerns.	 Considering	








need	 to	 support	 the	 systematic	
derivation	 of	 credentials	 satisfying	
specific	 security	 requirements	
expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 accessibility	 of	
agents	 to	 assets	 or	 areas.	 This	 would	
allow	security	administrators	to	manage	
the	 complexity	 associated	 with	
maintaining	 the	 access	 control	 system	
by	 avoiding	 manual	 definition	 of	
policies.	
We	(still)	need	accurate	role	models.	
It	 is	 necessary	 to	 maintain	 a	 mapping	
between	 changes	 in	 roles	 that	 happen,	
for	 example,	 due	 to	 changes	 of	 work	
projects,	and	the	resources	to	which	the	
new	roles	require	to	access.	This	would	
allow	 the	 access	 control	 system	 to	
change	automatically	the	access	control	
policies	affected	by	such	changes.	
Complex	 requirements	 are	 still	
useful.	 More	 complex	 requirements	
should	 constrain	 the	 paths	 that	 agents	
can	 traverse	 to	 reach	 certain	 states.	
Moreover,	 specific	 sequences	 of	
interactions	 of	 agents	 in	 a	 smart	 space	
might	 lead	 to	 violations	 of	 access	
control	 policies.	 Such	 is	 the	 case	when,	
for	example,	a	confidential	document	 is	
printed	 and	 access	 to	 the	 printer	 room	
must	 be	 revoked	 until	 the	 owner	
collects	 the	 document.	 Inherent	 to	 this	
scenario	 is	 that	 access	 rights	 to	 the	
printer	 room	 must	 be	 temporarily	
revoked,	 even	 if	 other	 agents	 are	
entitled	to	them	according	to	prevailing	
policies.	 Dealing	 with	 such	 scenarios	
requires	 verifying	 access	 control	
policies	 on	 different	 evolutions	 of	 the	
topology	of	the	smart	space.	This	would	
allow	 the	 enforcement	 of	 finer	 grained	
behaviour,	 such	 as	 conditional	 access	
depending	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	
configuration	 of	 the	 space.	 This	 is	 also	
useful	 for	 authentication	 purposes,	
where	 complex	 protocols	 involving	 a	
specific	 sequence	 of	 actions	 should	 be	
enacted.	
Planning	 to	 adapt.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 of	
dynamic	access	control	systems,	capable	
of	 adapting	 at	 runtime,	 to	 react	 to	
changes	 in	 topology.	 Changes	 in	 the	








topology	 triggered	 by	 movements	 of	
assets	in	the	physical	or	cyber	space	can	
change	 the	 attack	 surface	 dynamically.	
Roles	 and	 context	 changes	 should	 also	
be	 taken	 into	 account	 as	 possible	
adaptation	 triggers.	 Indeed	 changes	 in	
roles	 might	 require	 reducing	 or	
escalating	 the	 current	 access	 control	
policies.	 However,	 in	 large	
organisations2	 access	 control	 policies	
are	 escalated	 when	 employees	 change	
their	 roles,	 without	 revising	 the	
credentials	 that	 have	 been	 granted	






free	 -	 it	 requires	 specifying	 triggers	 of	
change	and	monitoring	for	such	changes	
continuously	 in	 order	 to	 update	 the	
current	 representation	 of	 the	 topology	
of	a	smart	space.	Those	changes	cannot	
always	be	monitored	automatically	(e.g.,	
agents	 movements).	 To	 make	 adaptive	
approaches	 accessible	 assurances	 are	
needed	 that	 reconfigurations	 of	 access	
control	 policies	 satisfy	 certain	 security	
requirements	 and	 do	 not	 over-entitle	
agents.	
Logging	 for	 topology	 awareness.	
Digital	devices	can	log	security-relevant	
information.	 For	 example,	 surveillance	
cameras	 and	 card	 readers	 can	 record	
who	 has	 traversed	 a	 building	 area	 or	
has	 accessed	 a	 room.	 Information	 from	
logs	may	be	used	for	different	purposes.	
First,	 it	 can	 help	 build	 a	more	 accurate	
map	of	the	building,	complementing	the	
information	 (e.g.,	 location	of	 computing	
devices,	 gateways,	 network	
connections)	that	is	originally	extracted	
from	 the	 BIM	 model,	 if	 available.	
Second,	logs	can	provide	hints	about	the	
building	 paths	 that	 are	 traversed	
frequently	 in	 order	 to	 apply	 more	 or	
less	restrictive	access	control	policies	to	
protect	 those	 passages	 and	 place	
surveillance	 cameras	 or	 other	 logging	
facilities	 that	might	be	useful	 for	 future	
forensic	 investigations.	 Finally,	
mismatches	 in	 logs	 can	 be	 used	 to	
identify	 anomalies.	 For	 example,	
recording	of	subsequent	accesses	by	an	
agent	 to	 rooms	 that	 are	 distant	 from	
each	may	 need	 to	 be	 flagged.	 Access	 of	
an	 agent	 to	 a	 room	 and	 usage	 by	 the	
same	agent	of	a	device	that	is	not	placed	
in	 that	 room	 can	 also	 indicate	 security	
problems.	
Open	Research	Issues	
Our	 experience	 has	 identified	 some	
further	 research	 directions	 that	 will	
extend	the	applicability	of	our	approach	
to	 more	 complex	 scenarios.	 We	 are	
planning	 to	 include	 in	 our	 model	 a	





Automating	 the	 assignment	 of	
credentials	 to	 roles,	 given	a	 specific	 set	
of	 requirements	 specified	 by	 security	
analysts	will	also	be	addressed	in	future	
work.	 Supporting	 adaptation	 of	
credentials	 when	 changes	 in	 topology,	
roles	 and	 other	 contextual	 factors	 take	
place	 is	 also	 an	open	 challenge.	 Finally,	
information	 mined	 from	 logs	 can	 be	
used	 to	 improve	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	
representation	 of	 the	 building	 topology	
that	could	be	updated	when	changes	are	
detected.	Logs	can	also	be	used	to	learn	
the	 behavioural	 patterns	 of	 the	 agents	
within	 the	building	 to	 support	 targeted	
surveillance	 and,	 more	 generally,	 to	
support	forensic	readiness.		
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Research	 in	 construction	 automation	 has	
leveraged	 the	 BIM	 standard	 to	 perform	
security	 analysis.	 For	 example,	 Chen	 et	 al.1	
propose	 a	 simulation	 technique	 to	 identify	
what	 parts	 of	 a	 physical	 space	 are	 covered	
when	 CCTV	 cameras	 are	 placed	 at	
predefined	 locations	 and	 have	 a	 specific	
focal	 length.	 Rafiee2	 detects	 intrusions	 of	
malicious	 agents	 in	 a	 physical	 area	 by	
identifying	 mismatches	 between	 the	
information	 provided	 by	 Ultra	 Wide	 Band	
Real-time	 Location	 Systems	 and	 the	 video	
recordings	 from	 CCTV	 cameras.	 BIM-
XACML3	 is	 a	 policy	 extension	 to	 eXtensible	
Access	Control	Markup	Language	(XACML4)	
that	 allows	 expressing	 access	 control	
conditions	 that	 involve	 reachability	
relationships	 that	 can	be	 inferred	 from	 the	
model	 of	 the	 building,	 including	 normal	
pathways,	 such	as	 corridors,	 stairways	and	
lifts,	 as	 well	 as	 indirect	 pathways	 such	 as	
ceiling	 spaces,	 partition	 walls,	 and	
ventilation	 ducts.	 Porter	 et	 al.5	 provide	 an	
approach	 for	 measuring	 the	 time	 that	 can	
be	taken	by	an	agent	to	reach	a	specific	area	
by	 considering	 the	 structure	 of	 a	 building	
and	 the	 time	 that	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 break	
barriers	 (e.g.,	doors,	windows,	walls)	made	
of	different	materials.		
However,	 existing	 work	 in	 construction	
automation	 has	 focused	 exclusively	 on	
physical	 security	 without	 considering	
cyber-physical	 threats	 exploiting,	 for	
example,	 network	 connectivity	 between	
computing	devices.	Recently,	existing	work6	
has	enriched	BIM	models	with	semantics	of	
cyber-physical	 space	 descriptions,	 focusing	
however	 on	 verification	 of	 reliability	
properties	regarding	evolution	of	the	space.	
Verification	 of	 access	 control	 policies	 has	
been	mainly	centered	on	XACML	and	RBAC.	
For	 example,	 Hu	 et	 al.7	 propose	 a	 SAT	
encoding	for	analysing	properties	of	XACML	
policies.	Anomaly	discovery	has	also	gained	
attention	 recently.	 For	 example,	 Hughes	 et	
al.8	 use	 a	 binary	 decision	 diagram	 based	
technique	 to	 check	 whether	 policy	
redundancies	exist.	Fitzgerald	et	al.9	further	
explore	 the	 notion	 of	 topology	 to	 formally	
define	 and	detect	 a	 larger	 set	 of	 anomalies	
for	physical	access	control,	such	as	building	
topology	anomalies	(e.g.,	one	or	more	areas	
of	 the	 building	 are	 not	 reachable	 from	 the	
outside),	 and	 conflicting	 policies.	 However,	
these	 approaches	 do	 not	 allow	 verifying	
access	 control	 policies	 depending	 on	
topological	properties,	such	as	containment	
and	 connectivity,	 expressed	 on	 both	 the	
cyber	 and	 physical	 space	 that	 a	 building	
inhabits.	 Moreover,	 they	 do	 not	 provide	
justifications	 to	 support	 the	 result	 of	 the	
analysis,	 which	 could	 provide	 guidance	 on	
how	 the	 policies	 should	 be	 revised	 if	
verification	fails.	
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